HIMA Safety & Security

Josse Brys Sales Director Europe

SHUMP.



#safetygoesdigital

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IEC61511 No safety without cyber security

Problem!

Who would you consult?

Who would you consult?






Pharmacy

General practitioner




Expert: Cardiologist



HIMA understands Safety better than any other company

HIMA: The leading Expert in Safety Solutions



HIMA helps to reduce the risk in your process with an independent layer

Layers of protection



Public and plant-specifc **Disaster prevention** measures e.g. retention basin **Damage mitigation** e.g. pressure relief valve **Mechanical protection** SIS (safety instrumented **Cyber Security** Safety shutdown HIMA system) DCS / BPCS Process alarm Monitoring and people Monitored DCS / BPCS Operation Process value


Investment New plant





Accidents happen?





Safety standard: IEC 61511 Ed.2





The Safety System shall be separate and independent

Safety standard: IEC 61511 Ed.2







Control system (DCS)

Safety system (SIS)




Do you want "tick the box" safety ? or enjoy the advantaged of a separated and independent SIS?



44%

Lifecycle & Frequency of Failures



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Specifications of SIS



SAMPLE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT RFQ

Key: Sample Language Bolded and Highlighted with yellow.

1.0 SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES

1.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The contractor shall perform the effort required by this Task Order on a Firm Fixed Price/Time and Materials/Labor Hour basis. The work shall be performed in accordance with all sections of this Task Order and the offeror's BPA GS-XX-XXXXX awarded under Schedule 874 for Acquisition Management Services.



CL Description Base Period	Quantity	Unit	Total Price
000 Acquisition Management Services	1	Lot	\$
000 ARRA services			
or			
л			
Labor Category	Hours	Hourly Rate	
	Hours	Hourly Rate	
Labor Category	Hours	Hourly Rate	

1.2.2 Option Period

Labor Category	Hours	Hourly Rate	
Contractor to quote.			
TOTAL HOURS			



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RFQ: Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)

Your requirements: A red car with a horse

What would you get?



A red car with a horse





A red car with a horse





SIL Levels


Most famous SIL requirement is the Probability of Failure on Demand

SIL	PFDavg	Safety Availability	Risk Reduction
4	0.0001 - 0.00001	0.9999 - 0.99999	10000 - 100000
3	0.001 - 0.0001	0.999 - 0.9999	1000 - 10000
2	0.01 - 0.001	0.99 - 0.999	100 - 1000
1	0.1 - 0.01	0.9 - 0.99	10 - 100

PFDavg = Probability of Failure on Demand average



Proof tests to keep your safety level



Proof-test challenges versus operation / production uptime



- Battle between Production & Safety engineers
- Production uptime has the priority
- the proof test are delayed to please the production
- Often during a planned/scheduled shutdown so what can you proof?

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What is Safety



Functional safety IEC 61511-2


*Risk*_{safety} = probability of a damage * potential of the damage




Cyber security IEC 62443-3-3 Risk_{security} = threat * vulnerability * potential of the damage















You think: it will never happens to me...

Until you are the target..





Petya-ransomware at Maersk




MAERSK

MAERS

Cyber attacks are real



Russia GRU caught hacking into OPCW via WIFI



OPCW = Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Cyber attacks are real



Cyber Attack on German Steel Mill Leads to 'Massive' Real World Damage

A steel mill in Germany lost control of its blast furnace. Hackers had infiltrated the mill's control system, according to the German government's office for information security.

BY R.A. BECKER THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 2015 NOVA NEXT



REVEALED: New era of state sponsored HACKING can turn oil rigs into 'BOMB that can KILL'

EXPERTS fear that hackers who seized control of a Saudi Arabian petrochemical site using malicious software labelled as 'Triton' and 'Trisis' could be being used by Iran, Russia and North Korea, marking a new era of cybercrime.






STUXNET: used in IRAN

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Cyber attacks are real







Internet

Cyber attacks are real



Triton /Trisis/ HATMAN December 2017

Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework "TRITON" and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure

Incident Summary


The attacker gained remote access to an SIS engineering workstation and deployed the TRITON attack framework to reprogram the SIS controllers





Security environment for Safety





Do you have full visibility of the risks on your SIS / IOT system?

You think you are safe?

With separated safety system of HIMA: You know you are safe!

Override of safety function







Cost > 70.000.000 €



Advantages of an Independent SIS





- 1. No need to upgrade when DCS upgrades
- 2. Clear separation between operations and safety
- 3. Higher Cyber security
- 4. No common cause errors
- 5. Smart safety test: automated proof testing reduce stop
- 6. Energy saving
- 7. In line with standards, license to operate
- 8. NON-STOP safety
- 9. Lower OPEX

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Digitalization of Functional Safety with Added Value

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Enduring Compliance

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Streamline Engineering

Effective Management of Change



Safety and

Security

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
HIMA: The leading Expert in Safety Solutions!

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
HIMA: The leading Expert in Safety Solutions



NON-STOP Functional safety



SMART SAFETY.



Who would you consult?





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Thank you.

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