

Introduction: Trinseo and who am I

- Global number one supplier of styrene butadiene / latex
- One of the world's largest suppliers of polystyrene
- Raw material delivered by our Ethylbenzene and Styrene monomer plants
- 70 years of technology leadership
- Split in 2010 from Dow Chemical
- Manufacturing sites in 16 countries around the world
- Trinseo has 2,500 – 3,000 employees



Trinseo is an active user of the CHEF and RAST tool

CHEF & RAST

Chemical Hazard Engineering Fundamentals Risk Analysis Screening Tools

Process Safety Technology Leader EBSM: Jeroen de Maat

- First version of RAST launched by The Dow Chemical Company in 2006
The tool is made in MS Excel.
- Since 2018 it is a public tool can become for free via EPSC and CCPS.
In the years it became a reliable scenario identification and risk evaluation tool
- Together with RAST the CHEF tool was issued for public

Difference between CHEF and RAST


- **CHEF** calculation for a single User selected scenario
Used for one LOPA scenario

- What are the Hazards?
- What can go wrong?
- What are the potential consequences?
- How likely is it to happen?
- Is the Risk Tolerable?



- **RAST** creates multiple scenario overview for process plant
Used for unit LOPA overview (and other PS reports)
- Hazard identification, scenario development, consequence evaluation, and risk analysis. As a part of this screening, RAST can assist users by providing a comprehensive Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), as well.

RAST in one picture



Input RAST:

➤ 1. Chemical Data

- Input sheet data
- Standard list of 366 Chemicals
- Can create a chemical mixture
- Adding a new chemical possible

➤ 2. Equipment Data

Parameter input sheet

- Selection possible for 30 different types of equipment

➤ 3. Process Conditions

➤ 4. Plant Layout Info

- Local information
- Enclosed process area data
- Building data
- Environmental inputs

➤ 5. Reactivity Input and Evaluation

- Input sheet data
- Reactivity screening
- Reactivity evaluation

Input failure in Input Error Check sheet

Clear Everything in Workbook

RAST

Risk Analysis Screening Tools (v.5.0.0)

Check Current Version Available

Import from Previous Study

Import from Standard LOPA Workbook

Update Previously Saved Information

Select Default Units: English Units SI Units Study File: RAST-V 5.0 for Manual Development.xlsmt

Session Date: Participants:

Equipment Identification = V-101

Equipment Type = Vessel/Tank

Equipment Location = Outdoors

Plant Section or Sub-Area: P&ID Number:

Input Information

Chemical Data Input

Equipment Parameter Input

Process Conditions Input

Plant Layout Input

Reaction Input and Evaluation

Input Guidance Information

Evaluations and Reports

Fire & Explosion Index / Chemical Exposure Index

Hazards & Consequences

Scenario Identification

Pump Deadhead Summary

Relief Effluent Screening

Pool Fire Evaluation

Check Inputs

Save Inputs to Equipment Table

Update Scenarios for Equipment Loaded

LOPA Menu

<< Go To Main Menu

Enter New Chemical

Save All Input to Equipment Table

Clear Input

Go To Equipment Input

Go To Process Conditions

Go To Plant Layout

Equipment Identification: R201

Equipment Type: Stirred Reactor/Crystallizer

Location: Indoors

Operating Temperature = 160 C

Operating Pressure (gauge) = 4 bar

Saturation Temperature = 169.0 C

Physical State = Liquid

Key Chemical: Tetrachloropyridine

Reference:

Chemical Comments:

Reg. Agency Considers Toxic? Yes

ERPG-3 Values, LC1, LC50, and/or Categories for Aquatic Toxicity or Dermal Toxicity must be entered

Chemicals (the first chemical listed is the "key chemical")

Wt Fraction Feed

Second Liq Phase

Wt Fraction Vapor

Relative Volatility

Molecular Weight

ERPG-2 (ppm)

ERPG-3 (ppm)

LFL (vol %)

Tetrachloropyridine

Sodium Hydroxide in Aqueous Solution

Water

Sum = 1.00

Vapor Mixture Properties: 20.4 101048.2 252620.6

Mixture azeotrope? Yes

Standard Mixture (the key chemical has been defined as a mixture)

Wt Fraction Feed

Second Liq Phase

Model as a single Pseudo-Chemical?

Summary of Chemical Properties

Estimated Boiling Point = 112.7 C

Vapor Pressure at Operating Temp = 3.954 atm

Liquid Density at Operating Temp = 1.10 gm/ml

Liq Heat Capacity at Op Temp = 0.73 cal/gm C

Liq Heat Capacity at Boiling Temp = 0.72 cal/gm

Heat of Vaporization at Op Temp = 460 cal/gm

Evaporation at Boiling Temp = 438

Mixture Properties

Mixture Estimates

User Values

Melting Point = -20 deg C

Flash Point = 1000 deg C

Est Mixture Flash Point?

No

No

Autolignition Temperature = 2000 deg C

Ease of Ignition = Low

Fuel Reactivity = High

Dermal Toxicity = Corrosive

Aquatic Toxicity = Harmful

High Viscous Material (for F&E)?

Mixture NFPA Flammability = 0

Mixture NFPA Health = 3

Reactivity Category = NA

Mixture NFPA Reactivity = 3

Liquid Conductivity = Semi-Conductive

Dust Characteristics

Dust/Solids Hazard Class =

Solids Mean Particle Size = micron

Particle Size at 10% Fraction = micron

Dust Min Ionization Energy = mJoule

Process/Operating Conditions

Ambient Temperature = 25 C

Liquid Limit (blank is unlimited) = 6 cu m

Inventory Head within Equipment, Δh = 2 m

Limiting Maximum Fill Fraction = 0.9

Limiting Minimum Fill Fraction = 0.1

Maximum Feed Press (gauge) = 3 bar

Maximum Feed or Flow Rate = 40 kg/min

Maximum Feed Temperature = 25 C

Type of Feed (Batch or Continuous) = Continuous

Non-Ignitable Atmosphere Maintained? Yes

Potential for Aerosol or Mist? No

Pad Gas Name =

Max Pad Gas Pressure (gauge) = bar

Maximum Pad Gas Rate = kg/min

Downstream Pressure (gauge) = bar

Maximum Back Flow Rate = kg/min

Equipment Vents to ... =

Relief Device Parameters

Relief Type = Rupture Disk

Relief Discharges to: Vent Header to Blow-down Tank

Relief Set Pressure (gauge) = 7 bar

Relief Size (equiv. diameter) = 400 mm

Relief Design Actual Flow Rate = 300 kg/min

Release Pipe Diameter = 7 mm

Release Elevation = 4 m

Closest Distance From Relief to Elevated Work Area = 4 m

Furthest Distance from Relief to Elevated Work Area = 10 m

Elevation of Nearest Work Area = 4 m

Enter Distances from Relief Location ONLY if Different from Equipment Location

Relief Distance to Property Limit or Fence Line = 7 m

Relief Distance to Occupied Bldg 1 or Area = 10 m

Relief Distance to Center of Occ Bldg 1 = 10 m

Occ Bldg 2 in Same Wind Direction for Relief? No

Relief Distance to Occupied Bldg 2 = m

Relief Distance to Center of Occ Bldg 2 = m

Time-based Release for Equipment Rupture? sec

<< Go To Main Menu

Go To Chemical Data

Save Input to Equipment Table

Clear Input

Go To Equipment Input

Go To Process Conditions

Go To Plant Layout

Go To Reaction Input

Equipment Identification: R201

Equipment Type: Stirred Reactor/Crystallizer

Location: Indoors

Layout Description

Occupied Building Data

Occupied Building 1 Name = Control room

Distance to Occupied Bldg 1 or Area = 5 m

Elevation of Occ Bldg 1 Ventilation Inlet = 3 m

Distance to Center of Occupied Bldg 1 = 7 m

Occupied Bldg Type = Local Construction

Occupied Bldg Ventilation Rate = 20 changes/hr

Number of Building Occupants = 5

Occ Bldg 2 in Same Wind Direction? No

Occupied Building 2 Name = Neighbour

Distance to Occupied Bldg 2 = 40 m

Elevation of Occ Bldg 2 Ventilation Inlet = 1 m

Distance to Center of Occ Bldg 2 = 60 m

Occupied Bldg 2 Type = Low Strength

Occupied Bldg 2 Ventilation Rate = 10 changes/hr

Number of Occupants Bldg 2 = 20

Reaction Data Input and Evaluation

Equipment Tag = R201

Key Chemical = Tetrachloropyridine

Physical State = Liquid

Reactivity Data Input

Assess Reactive Scenarios Only? No

Table / User User Value

Data Reference:

Ken First

Ken First

Heat of Reaction, ΔHR (cal/gm mix) = -74

Activation Energy, ΔE (Kcal/gm mole) = 30

Detected Onset, T₀ (C) = 65

Detected Rate, R₀ (C/min) = 1

Gas Generation, k (g mole/loc mix) = No

Gas Generation precedes Exotherm? No

Inhibited Monomer? No

Thermal Inertia (ARC or other), θ = No

Test Method = Theoretical

Limiting Reaction Rate = -1.5 cal/gm mix-min

Reaction Catalyzed for this Equipment? Yes

Potential for "Pooling" of Reactants? No

Reactants in Separate Liquid Phase? Yes

Reaction of Reaction Heat for "Pooling" potential/Mis-Loading of Reactants? Yes

Multiple of Reaction Heat for Mis-Loading for Mixing Incompatible Materials? Yes

Induced Exothermic Reaction (for Reaction with Condensed Phase Explosive)? No

Induced Endothermic Reaction (for Reaction with Condensed Phase Explosive)? No

Hydrolysis

Endothermic Reaction? No

Reaction Heat Gain or Cooling Loss versus Temperature

(Exothermic Reaction Assuming First Order Kinetics)

Heat Rate (cal/gm mix-min)

Temperature (°C)

Reaction Pressure versus Temperature

(Adiabatic Exothermic Reaction Assuming First Order Kinetics)

Pressure (atm absolute)

Temperature (°C)

Reaction Screening Calculations

Initial Temperature = 160.0 C

Max Adiabatic Temp = 260.5 C

Reaction Scenario Type = Reaction

Reaction Scenario Type = Reaction

Temperature (C) TMR

Time to Relief 169.2 deg C

25 49.3 79.8 Minutes

50 49.3 67.6 Minutes

100 49.3 43.3 Minutes

150 49.3 19.0 Minutes

ne to Maximum Rate at Specified Starting Temperature

Reaction Scenario Type = Reaction

Temperature (C) TMR

Time to Relief 169.2 deg C

25 49.3 79.8 Minutes

50 49.3 67.6 Minutes

100 49.3 43.3 Minutes

150 49.3 19.0 Minutes

Review of Operating Procedures for Selected Equipment Item by: Review Date:

RAST INPUT SHEETS

Screening RAST

- ▶ Items for Screening is based on
 - 30 equipment types
 - 24 Initiating events type evaluations
 - 50 Incident types
 - 53 scenario types
- All items can be added with a self created User type

Hazard Summary in RAST

[illegible]

Scenario Identification in RAST

Scenario Type with Comments or Description

HAZOP Parameters and Deviations

Most Common Initiating Event with Description

Potential Outcomes and Target Factors

Suggested Scenarios from the RAS Library

Scenario Type	Scenario Comments	Deviation	Initiating Event (Cause)	Initiating Event Description	Incident	Potential Outcomes/Target Factors
Drain or Vent Valve Open	Drain or Vent Valve left open. Allow for frequent maintenance.	Flow-Loss of Containment	Human Failure Action once per quarter or less	Operator leaves Drain or Vent Open following frequent maintenance	Drain or Vent Hole Size	7 6 7 5 6 6
Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposure	Vapor Pressure exceeds Relief Set or Burst Pressure from Pool Fire Exposure	Pressure-High	IEP as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety	Leak of flammable material or material above its Flash Point which may ignite	Vapor Relief/Vent - Fire Conditions	8 7 7 6 7 6
Loss of inert Argon Ingress with Headspace Delegation	Chemicals is Flammable or Combustible. Maximum Temperature exceeds Flash Point less 5°C	Composition-Varying Concentration	SPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Failure of Pressure or NonCombustible Atmosphere Control	Equipment Rupture - Degradation	8 7 5 7 5 6 6
Overfill, Overflow, or Backflow	Overfill or Backflow of liquid with spill rate equal to the feed rate to a maximum quantity of the available inventory minus contained mass	Level-High or Flow-Backflow	SPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Failure of Level Indication with continued addition of material	Overfill Release	8 7 5 6 7 5 6
Piping or Equipment LOPC - Extremely Large	Largest Pipe or Nozzle Size less than 250 mm diameter	Flow-Loss of Containment	IEP as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety	Failure from corrosion, fatigue, etc.	Extremely Large Hole Size Leak (250 mm)	8 7 6 7 5 6 7
Piping or Equipment LOPC - Medium	Mechanical Integrity. Loss of Containment for 25 mm hole Size	Flow-Loss of Containment	IEP as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety	Failure from corrosion, fatigue, etc.	Medium Hole Size Leak (100 mm)	7 6 7 5 6 6
Piping or Equipment LOPC - Very Large	Largest Pipe or Nozzle Size less than 100 mm diameter	Flow-Loss of Containment	IEP as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety	Failure from corrosion, fatigue, etc.	Very Large Hole Size Leak (100 mm)	8 7 5 6 7 5 6
Piping or Equipment LOPC - Very Small	Mechanical Integrity. Loss of Containment for 5 mm hole Size	Flow-Loss of Containment	IEP as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety	Failure from corrosion, fatigue, etc.	Very Small Hole Size Leak (5 mm)	8 6 6 6 6
Excessive Heat Input - Mechanical	Working Pressure or Relief Pressure at Maximum Temperature from Mechanical Energy Input			Isolation or Pump Recirculation set	Consequence Does Not Exceed Criteria with LOPA	
Excessive Vapor Flow	Vent from Liquid Displacement during filling or pad gas is Blue				Consequence Does Not Exceed Criteria with LOPA	


Scenario Cases where Hazard Screening does not indicate a need for further Analysis shown in "Gray"

Maximum Allowable Leak Rate (MALR)									
<i>This Worksheet for Calculation Only - Results are Not Saved - Print this page if a copy is needed.</i>									
Equipment Identification:	R201								
Equipment Type:	Street Reactor/Crystallizer								
<p>Maximum Allowable Leak Rate is the maximum flow that can leak by a valve used as the final element in a LOPA scenario without exceeding a threshold consequence criteria.</p> <p>There are generally three cases to consider:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> LIMIT the release rate of hazardous material such that the consequence has been essentially eliminated (this is typically based on distance to multiple of ERPG-3 or 1/2 LFL is less than 3 m). STOP the scenario propagation by limiting the continued addition of material or energy to less than natural ability of the system to remove (such as the flow rate of heat transfer fluid that prevents further heating of the system). DELAY the potential for catastrophic failure for a sufficiently long period of time (such as the flow rate which delays hydraulic overpressure for at least 24 hours) by limiting the continued addition of material or energy. 									
LIMIT - Maximum Release Rate of Hazardous Material:									
Leak Location Indoor Process Volume ERPG-3 at Initial Vapor Composition Lower Flammable Limit at Initial Vapor Composition Approximate Flash + Pool Evaporation Fractions	<table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <tr><td>200</td></tr> <tr><td>2562020</td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> <tr><td>1.000</td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> </table>	200	2562020		1.000				Assumed Outdoors if blank m³ ppm vol % Kg/min Kg/min
200									
2562020									
1.000									
Maximum Allowable Leak Rate for 0.5 LFL < 3 m: Maximum Allowable Leak Rate for 0.5 LFL < 3 m:									
Temperature Alarm Set Point									
Equipment Surface Area Heat Loss Coefficient (no Insulation): Alarm Temperature: Heat Loss Rate at Temperature Alarm:	<table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <tr><td>16.94</td></tr> <tr><td>0.01</td></tr> <tr><td>C</td></tr> <tr><td>-4.24</td></tr> </table>	16.94	0.01	C	-4.24	m² Kwatt/m² C C Kwatt			
16.94									
0.01									
C									
-4.24									
Heat Transfer:									
Heat Transfer Fluid Heat Transfer Fluid Temperature: Heat Capacity:	<table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <tr><td>170</td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> </table>	170			C Kjoule/Kg C				
170									
Maximum Allowable Heating Media Leak Rate:									
<i>Heating Media Temperature is less than Boiling Point at MAWP or Relief Set - Overpressure May Not Occur</i>									
Raction:									
Fraction Limiting Reagent within Reaction Mixture: Heat of Reaction Reaction Temperature of No Return Heat Loss Rate at Temperature Alarm	<table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <tr><td></td></tr> <tr><td>-309.8</td></tr> <tr><td>C</td></tr> <tr><td>>TNR</td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> <tr><td></td></tr> </table>		-309.8	C	>TNR			Kgoule/Kg Reaction Mixture C Kwatt Kg/min	
-309.8									
C									
>TNR									
Maximum Allowable Heating Addition Rate:									
<i>Alarm Temperature is less than Ambient Temperature</i>									

Consequence summary in RAST

[illegible]

ta and Evaluation



Screening and Calculating

Calculation RAST

- ▶ Scenario calculation
 - Per selected equipment
 - Done for all scenarios
 - Results in an unmitigated Risk value
 - Effect Target factor
 - Probability of Ignition / Explosion
 - Probability of Exposure
 - Time at Risk (input from User)
 - This is the input for your LOPA

Example LOPA Analysis

Note Target Factor, Initiating Event Factor and Enabling Factors are Pre-Populated.

Enter "Yes" to Select Scenario Cases

Equipment Loaded

V-101

<< Go To LOPA Menu

Export to Excel

LOPA Worksheet

Defines a Unique Scenario

LOPA Worksheet Entry

Create User Scenario

Modify User Scenario

Clear Results

Risk Summary

Factors are Pre-Populated.

Cases

Scenario	Cross Ref	Plant Section or Sub-Area	Equipment Tag	Equipment Type	Scenario Type	Initiating Event General Description	Incident Type	Outcome	Target Factor	Enabling Factor	Initiating Event Factor	Probability of the Enabling Factor	Probability of the Initiating Event Factor	Probability of the Outcome	Time at Risk or Other Consequences	Other Factor	LOPA effectiveness Rating	Worst Case Scenario for Further Analysis	Source	Tool Version Used for Last Calc	Comparison with Last Run		
1.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Pressure Damage	Regulator Failure	Equipment Rupture at Operating	Off-Site Toxic Release	8	1	1	0	0	0	2	5	5	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	Revised	
2.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Drain or Vent Valve Open	Human Failure Action once per quarter	Drain or Vent Valve Size	Off-Site Toxic Release	7	7	2	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
3.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Drain or Vent Valve Open	Human Failure Action once per quarter	Drain or Vent Valve Size	On-Site Toxic Release	6	6	2	0	0	0	2	2	2	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
4.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Drain or Vent Valve Open	Human Failure Action once per quarter	Drain or Vent Valve Size	Toxic Infiltration	7	7	2	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
5.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Drain or Vent Valve Open	Human Failure Action once per quarter	Drain or Vent Valve Size	Flash, Jet, or Pool Fire	6	6	2	2	1	1	0	2	-1	-1	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New
6.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	EF=3 as determined by Tech Center	Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	Off-Site Toxic Release	8	8	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
7.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	EF=3 as determined by Tech Center	Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
8.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
9.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
10.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
11.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
12.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
13.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
14.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
15.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	Bleed Valve Input - Pool Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
16.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
17.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
18.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
19.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
20.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
21.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
22.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
23.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	
24.01			V-101	Vessel/Tank	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	Overflow, Overfill, or Backflow	On-Site Toxic Release	7	7	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	High TFP & IPL	Yes	Tool	5.0.0	New	

Example LOPA

4: Select LOPA Workbook.

Information from the LOPA Workbook for additional inputs and evaluation.

Ensure LOPA Team understands the Scenario and its consequences.

Notes column for clarity.

Example LOPA Analysis

4: Select LOPA Workbook. Information from the RAST evaluation will be captured in the LOPA Workbook for additional inputs and evaluation by the LOPA Team.


Ensure LOPA Team understands each Scenario and its consequences. Use **Notes** column for clarity as appropriate

Scenario	Scenario Description	Scenario Definition	Probability of Scenario (Frequency of Failure)	Time at Risk or Other Consequences	LOPA Effectiveness	Independent Protection Layers	Notes
Scenario 1	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	The incident could result in an off-site toxic release if a BLEVE occurs in a vessel containing a toxic liquid or gas. The vessel is located in a high population area and the release could result in a fatality.	1.0E-05	1000 hours	High	Standard Score: 1000	
Scenario 2	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	The incident could result in an off-site toxic release if a BLEVE occurs in a vessel containing a toxic liquid or gas. The vessel is located in a high population area and the release could result in a fatality.	1.0E-05	1000 hours	High	Standard Score: 1000	
Scenario 3	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	The incident could result in an off-site toxic release if a BLEVE occurs in a vessel containing a toxic liquid or gas. The vessel is located in a high population area and the release could result in a fatality.	1.0E-05	1000 hours	High	Standard Score: 1000	
Scenario 4	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	The incident could result in an off-site toxic release if a BLEVE occurs in a vessel containing a toxic liquid or gas. The vessel is located in a high population area and the release could result in a fatality.	1.0E-05	1000 hours	High	Standard Score: 1000	
Scenario 5	Loss of Inert or Air Ingress	The incident could result in an off-site toxic release if a BLEVE occurs in a vessel containing a toxic liquid or gas. The vessel is located in a high population area and the release could result in a fatality.	1.0E-05	1000 hours	High	Standard Score: 1000	

LOPA Team should update the Initiating Event description and ensure the appropriate factor is used.

LOPA Team completes the detailed Protective Layer description and selects IPL from the "pull down" Menu.

Relationship of RAST, LOPA Workbook and SIS/LOPA Database



RAST is a collection of Scenario generation, identification of Risk and Process Risk Analyzing tools

How can your company obtain with these tools?

→ Just download tools, presentations, manuals and cases from one of these webpages

→ EPSC - European Process Safety Centre



→ CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety.



→ The become an experienced user join the EPSC RAST User Group

→ EPSC and CCPS maintain the tools, we are now already at the third RAST upgrade