




# Introduction to Process Safety Engineering

## *Lessons learned from incidents*

By Geert Vercruysse


PS Conference, Dordrecht, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2018

# 8 Safety Functions for a Chemical Plant

- 
1. Prevention of loss of containment due to process upsets
  2. Prevention of loss of containment due to degradation.
  3. Limitation of the size of an accidental release.
  4. Control of spreading of substance accidentally released.
  5. Prevention of ignition of explosive atmospheres.
  6. Mitigation of damage due to fire.
  7. Mitigation of damage due to explosion.
  8. Mitigation of damage due to toxic release.

Cfr. Presentation by FOD WASO

# Layers of Protection



# Introduction

## Batch Reactor

- Widely used
- Small volume applications
- General-purpose equipment can be shared between several products & processes
- By nature of batch operation no steady state operation
- Secure follow up of the sequence of the process steps – mimic “golden batch” typical

## Distillation Column


- Objective: separation of mixtures in pure components or different fractions.
- Technology is energy intensive as separation is based on gas / liquid interchange.
- “Internals” in a distillation column will not be further discussed. No fundamental difference in equipment design conditions nor process safety concept.



# Introduction


- As technologies in the process industry are energy intensive there is a strong focus on the overpressure protection.
- This means that when a failure occurs the design conditions (pressure/temperature) should not be exceeded.
- Additionally it's important to know and understand the background and dimensioning of the safety concept, especially for the evaluation of MOC's (Management of Change – on all changes).
- In the next slide some generic failures are presented which should be included in the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA).

# Batch Polymerisation Reactor – Process Safety Scenarios




# Distillation – Process Safety Scenarios

- |                                    |   |
|------------------------------------|---|
| (1) Loss of cooling                | (9) Valve opening to an external source |
| (2) Loss of power                  | (10) Loss of heating upstream column    |
| (3) Loss of steam                  | (11) Failure of exchanger               |
| (4) Loss of instrument air         | (12) Exterior fire                      |
| (5) Failure of steam controller    | (13) Accumulation of non-condensables   |
| (6) Failure of pressure controller | (14) Chemical reaction                  |
| (7) Failure of feed controller     | (15) Closed column outlets              |
| (8) Failure of reflux controller   |   |




# Overpressure Protection Distillation Columns

## Intrinsic safe




Design  
Intrinsic Safe

## Mechanical Safety Concept



Design  
Relief valve

## Instrumental Safety Concept



Design  
SIL-interlock

Design  
SIL-interlock



# Mechanical Safety Concept

- Relief devices are usually designed to protect the equipment and auxiliaries from overpressure due to any single cause.
- The probability of two unrelated failures occurring simultaneously is considered remote and is not normally designed for.
- **API RP 521** defines causes to be unrelated if no process, mechanical or electrical linkages exist among them.

# Instrumentational Safety Concept

- Safety instrumented functions are usually designed to protect the equipment and auxiliaries from overpressure due to different type of causes.
  
- **IEC 61511** is the guideline used in EMEA.
  
- Specific engineering concepts:
  - Functional safety – the complete set up from sensor till actor is described.
  - “Voting systems” 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo3, ...
  - Complexity requires on line testing – calibration.

# Process Safety ... still more to be done

Process Safety ... still more to be done :

Time	Incident
Nov 2013	Steam clamp explosion at Total Antwerp
Jun 2014	Explosion at Shell Moerdijk
Jan 2015	Pipe rupture and Explosion at BASF Antwerp
Feb 2016	Runaway and explosion at Indaver Antwerp
Oct 2016	HP Ethylene pipe explosion at BASF Lu
Aug 2017	Furnace Fire at Exxon Refinery

Process Safety Incidents (LOPC) are investigated and root causes are addressed.


# Process Safety ... still more to be done

## Industry 4.0

- Further focus on :
  - Prevention of loss of containment due to process upsets.
  - Prevention of loss of containment due to degradation.
  - Prevention of human and organizational errors.
  
- Industry 4.0 will lead to better tools to tackle main root causes leading to Process Safety Incidents :
  - Specific tool for isolation management.
  - Improved communication tools between operating teams and maintenance.
  - Visualization tool for permits and process systems – improve decision making for emergency management.


# Industry 4.0

## Improve Standard Operating Procedures




# Process Safety ... still more to be done

## Know How & Competence





# Know How & Competence Deliverables from the organization



# Conclusions

- Recent incidents shows further need to focus on know how and competence.
- During revalidation of process safety study important incidents need to be incorporated in safety concept (“Lessons Learned”).
- Many have to do with start up or non-routine activities – new tools are under development to support Operations & Maintenance.
- “Keep the memory alive”

**We create chemistry**  
that makes questions love  
answers.



 **BASF**

We create chemistry